



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANDIGANBAYAN
QUEZON CITY

THIRD DIVISION

**PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,**

Plaintiff,

- versus -

**ANTONIO DELA PENA
BELICENA, et al.,**

Accused.

**Criminal Cases Nos. SB-
06-CRM-0383 to 0384**

For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and
estafa defined and
penalized under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code

Present:

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,
Chairperson,
FERNANDEZ, B., J. and
MORENO, J.

Promulgated:

JUNE 22, 2020 

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RESOLUTION

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.:

For resolution is accused Elenita C. Mababangloob's
"Motion to Dismiss" dated February 5, 2020.¹

Accused-movant Mababangloob prays that the cases
against her be dismissed on the ground of a violation of her
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

In support of her *motion*, she narrates the following factual
antecedents that purportedly transpired in these cases, to wit:

¹ pp. 95-119, Vol. VII, Record



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1. On or about **January 19, 2000**, various documents were endorsed to the Presidential Task Force (SPTF) 156 relative to the application, processing and approval of Tax Credit Certificates (TCC) involving several bus companies including that of the accused Mababangloob;²
2. Then sometime in February 2000, the accused Mababangloob received a copy of the letter dated **February 17, 2000**³ from Alberto Salanga, Executive Committee Member, Special Presidential Task Force 156, inviting her to appear before the latter's office, regarding [the] alleged Tax Credit Scam, to shed light anent her Tax Credit Application No. 98-D-0017;
3. The accused Mababangloob thru her counsel Atty. Isagani Cruz then requested for copies of documents regarding the investigation on **February 25, 2000**;⁴
4. Accused Mababangloob then filed her affidavit dated **March 3, 2000**,⁵ professing her innocence in the alleged transactions regarding the issuance of the Tax Credit Certificate;
5. The accused at the first instance thru her affidavit disclosed that it was a certain Joseph Cabotaje⁶ who convinced her to apply for [a] Tax Credit but everything was processed by this Cabotaje who turns [out] later on to be her co-accused in the instant case; in fact, she asserted that the documents she supplied to this Cabotaje are different from the ones subject of the Tax Credit Certificate;

² Footnote omitted

³ *Id*

⁴ *Id*

⁵ *Id*

⁶ *Id*

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
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6. Thereafter, on **April 10, 2000**, the SPTF filed a Complaint dated April 7, 2000 with the Department of Justice;
7. Elenita and [her] lawyer then awaited whatever Resolution that would come out from the Department of Justice;
8. Somehow, her then counsel thru constant follow-up learned that Informations dated May 16, 2006, were filed with the Honorable Sandiganbayan on **June 25, 2006** and an Order of Arrest dated **September 26, 2006** was issued against [the] accused, received by the Sherriff's Office on **October 12, 2006**;
9. However, her long-trusted lawyer Atty. Isagani Ramos [Cruz] suffered a stroke and upon [the] advice of some person, whom she could no longer recall, accused Mababangloob filed a Motion to [R]educe Bail on **October 25, 2006**⁷ with the Honorable Court setting the same for hearing on November 9, 2006;
10. Not knowing that she has to be present on the scheduled hearing for the Motion, she did not go to the Honorable Court;
11. Much later on, wondering what happened to her case since no notice whatsoever was being received by Mababangloob, she sent a representative to inquire about the status of her case but was informed that the case was archived;
12. In the meantime, the case apparently proceeded with the rest of the accused until a Decision was rendered by the Honorable Court on **October 19, 2019**;
13. Pursuant to the Decision, an alias warrant of arrest dated October 25, 2019, was issue[d] against the accused Mababangloob;

⁷Id



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
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14. Thus, on December 6, 2019, Mababangloob, who has maintained her address all throughout the start of the preliminary investigation, the duration of the trial and the rendition of the Decision, was arrested and detained first at a Las Piñas Police Station and then eventually transferred to the Sandiganbayan detention facility;
15. A lawyer in the name of Atty. Henry Tendido then filed an "*Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and/or allow accused to post bail with application to be heard on shorter notice*" dated December 10, 2019;
16. Accused Mababangloob was arraigned on **December 10, 2019** and was allowed to post the reduced bail of Twenty Thousand (Php20,000.00) Pesos for each case filed against her;
17. Upon her release and perplexed by the turn of events, accused Mababangloob photocopied all the records of the case and found out that the following significant developments in the case, to wit:
 - 17.1. The Office of the Ombudsman by [a] Review "Resolution" has ordered the filing of the Informations against accused Mababangloob and her co-accused on **July 25, 2006**,⁸ which is SIX (6) YEARS and THREE (3) MONTHS from the time that the complaint by the SPTF was filed on **April 10, 2008**,⁹ Incidentally, the complaint as covered by the Informations in the instant cases concerned transactions that happened sometime in 1998 which is now estimatedly [sic] TWENTY TWO (22) YEARS AGO;
 - 17.2. To emphasize, the Informations dated May 16, 2006 in the instant case were actually filed before the Honorable Court on **July 25, 2006**, SIX YEARS AND THREE MONTHS from the

⁸ *Id*

⁹ *Id*



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time that the Complaint from [the] SPTF was filed on April 7, 2000;

- 17.3. There was a Letter of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) dated November 13, 2007,¹⁰ addressed to the Honorable Court inquiring whether the warrants against certain accused including Mababangloob were still outstanding and nothing in the records would show that a response was made relative thereto;
18. Not included in the records of the Honorable Court was her letter¹¹ submitted to the Department of Justice with Supplemental Counter-[A]ffidavit submitting delivery receipts which are different from the delivery receipts that led to the filing of the Informations against her and her co-accused thus bolstering her innocence of the charges against her;
19. Accused Mababangloob has gone over most of the notices of the Orders in the court records and found out that her address was indicated at **Lot 22, Blk. 34, Gladiola St., TS Cruz Subd., Las Pinas City**, the same address reflected in the Informations;
20. The accused Elenita Mababangloob has maintained her address at **Lot 22, Blk. 34, Gladiola St., TS Cruz Subd., Las Pinas City**, and has not changed residence and as proof thereof, attached the following documents, to wit:

- 20.1. Senior Citizen's ID and Driver's License
- 20.2. Unified Multipurpose ID
- 20.3. Barangay Certification dated January 20, 2022
- 20.4. Tax Declaration dated September 10, 2002
- 20.5. Billing Statements

- a. Maynilad
- b. Meralco
- c. PLDT

¹⁰ *Id*

¹¹ *Id*




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21. As certified to by the Barangay Chairman, accused Mababangloob is a long-time resident of said address and as further proof she attached herein photocopies of the Certificate of Live Birth of her two children, Anne Maureen Mababangloob and Leah Juaymah Mababangloob marked as **Annex "17"** and **"17-a"** respectively;
22. From the foregoing, it is puzzling why no notice/s were sent nor received by accused Mababangloob despite the fact that she has not changed address; in fact, she was arrested at her house on December 6, 2019 which she has maintained even prior to the inception of the inquiry from the SPTF until the Decision concerning her co-accused was rendered and until her arrest and even up to the present time;
23. All told, accused Mababangloob most respectfully submit that the Office of the Ombudsman together with the Department of Justice committed inordinate delay, violating her right to speedy disposition of her cases when the preliminary investigation lasted for about six (6) years from the time a Complaint against her was filed on **April 2006** until the Informations were filed on **April 2006** and also violated her right to speedy trial when it failed, with all due respect to prosecute the case against her for a little less than THIRTEEN YEARS, from the time Informations were filed on **April 2006** until her arrest on **December 6, 2019** and arraignment on **December 10, 2019**.¹²

Relying on the case of **People v. Coscolluela**,¹³ the accused-movant asserts that due to the lapse of a long period of time in these cases, *"it has become now doubly difficult to locate the documents that would prove that [her] delivery receipts pertaining to the [subject] Tax Credit Certificate were actually*

¹² pp. 98-101, Vol. VII, Record

¹³ 701 SCRA 188 (2013)

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different from that submitted to the Honorable Court and that she actually did not benefit from the purported Tax Credit as she has paid the full amount of the purchase price of her buses to the extreme damage and prejudice of the accused;” she can no longer locate her witnesses; her husband, who was a witness to most of her dealings, died on February 13, 2013;¹⁴ and, she would have a “*hard time*” in recalling events and conversations that occurred a very long time ago.¹⁵

To further bolster her bid for the dismissal of these cases on the ground of the existence of inordinate, she invokes the rulings of the Sandiganbayan in the cases of ***People v. Winston Garcia, et al.***,¹⁶ and ***People v. Efren Tungol***,¹⁷ wherein the Court (Second and Sixth Divisions) dismissed the said cases after it found a violation of the accused’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.¹⁸

Finally, the accused-movant avers that it has been twenty-two (22) years since she was first ordered by the SPTF to appear before its fact-finding investigation. According to her, the difficulty in locating documents and witnesses in support of her defense is “*enormous*,” and, even if she would be able to locate them, it is doubtful that they could recall the particulars of the events which had long taken place.¹⁹

In its “*Opposition*” dated February 4, 2020,²⁰ the prosecution points out that it took more than thirteen (13) years for the accused-movant to raise the issue of inordinate delay in these cases; hence, her assertion thereof is a “*convenient justification*” for the dismissal of the present cases at this stage of the proceedings.²¹

¹⁴ pp. 103-104, *Id*

¹⁵ p. 111, *Id*

¹⁶ Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0292 [Per J. Diaz-Baldos, Second Division]

¹⁷ Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0045 [Per J. Ponferrada, Sixth Division]

¹⁸ pp. 104-110, *Id*

¹⁹ p. 114, *Id*

²⁰ pp. 175-180, *Id*

²¹ p. 176, *Id*

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It argues that the accused-movant herself admitted in her *motion* that she already learned of the filing of the present *Informations* as early as 2006. In fact, she filed a *motion to reduce bail* on October 25, 2006, but never pursued the same.²²

Moreover, the prosecution submits that the records of these cases show that the accused-movant opted not to submit herself to the jurisdiction of this Court after learning of the filing of the present *Informations* in 2006. It adds that she had all the opportunity to move for the dismissal of these cases in 2006 upon posting the necessary bail bond. However, she never bothered to post bail.²³ Thus, her failure to move for the dismissal of these cases based on an alleged violation of her constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases has long prescribed.²⁴

The prosecution likewise avers that there was no inordinate delay in conduct of the preliminary investigation of these cases. It argues that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice. Rather, several factors peculiar to these cases, such as: [1] the reason for the delay; [2] the assertion of such right by the accused; and [3] the prejudice caused to the accused, should be taken into consideration in determining whether there has been a violation of the accused's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.²⁵

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The Court finds the subject *motion* unmeritorious.

To begin with, jurisprudence teems with cases which hold that although the Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a relative and

²² p. 176, *Id*

²³ pp. 176-177, *Id*

²⁴ p. 177, *Id*

²⁵ pp. 178-179, *Id*

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flexible concept.²⁶ To properly define such concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account.²⁷ Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that courts must carefully scrutinize the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case,²⁸ taking into consideration the following factors, namely: [1] length of delay; [2] reason for the delay; [3] accused's assertion or non-assertion of his/her right to speedy disposition of cases; and [4] prejudice suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. Thus, the cases invoked by the accused-movant to support her claim of inordinate delay cannot be blindly applied to the present cases without a close scrutiny of the factual antecedents of the present cases.

The records of these cases show that the cases against the accused-movant stemmed from a *Complaint* dated April 7, 2000,²⁹ filed by the Special Presidential Task Force 156 (SPTF-156) before the Department of Justice (DOJ) for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and the crime of *falsification* under Article 171 (2) in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The said *complaint* was in connection with the alleged irregularities in the *One Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center* at the Department of Finance, in complicity with certain employees of Juaymah-Maureen Transport Service. In its *Resolution* dated November 18, 2002, the DOJ recommended that [1] respondents Belicena, Andutan, Jr., De Vera, Marzan, and Mababangloob be indicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019; [2] respondent Mababangloob be indicted for *falsification*; and, [3] the complaint against respondent Cabotaje be dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.³⁰




²⁶ See *Ombudsman v. Jurado*, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), *Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan* 442 SCRA 294 (2004), *Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan*, 360 SCRA 478 (2001), *Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.*, 327 SCRA 145 (2000), *Magsaysay, et al., v. Sandiganbayan*, 316 SCRA 65 (1999) and *Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan*, 220 SCRA 55 (1993)

²⁷ *People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)*, 861 SCRA 285 (2018); *Remulla v. Sandiganbayan*, 823 SCRA 17 (2017)

²⁸ *Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)*, 875 SCRA 374 (2018); See also *People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)*, 861 SCRA 285 (2018); *Remulla v. Sandiganbayan*, 823 SCRA 17 (2017); *Ombudsman v. Jurado*, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), *Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan* 442 SCRA 294 (2004), *Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan*, 360 SCRA 478 (2001); Emphasis supplied

²⁹ pp. 31-33, Vol. I, Record

³⁰ pp. 18-30, *Id*

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Thereafter, a case was filed against the said respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman in 2003 and it was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0037-A. On March 14, 2003, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the crime of *falsification* under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in his *Memorandum* dated July 24, 2003, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., recommended that the respondents be indicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the crime of *estafa*. In its *Memorandum* dated April 24, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman found that the respondents should be indicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the crime of *estafa*. Thus, on July 25, 2006, the present *Informations* were filed with the Court.³¹


In the relatively recent case of **Cagang v. Sandiganbayan**,³² the Supreme Court ruled that for purposes of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of a formal *complaint* and the subsequent conduct of a preliminary investigation. Based thereon, the Court thus holds that the Office of the Ombudsman took approximately three (3) years to terminate the preliminary investigation in these cases, counted from the time the case against the accused was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in 2003 up to the filing of the present *Informations* with the Court in 2006.

While the time spent by the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of these cases may have been protracted, this should not be the sole determinant on whether the accused-movant's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated. To stress, the determination of the existence of inordinate delay is not measured through mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.³³

³¹ p. 1, Vol. I, Record

³² 875 SCRA 374 (2018)

³³ See note 26

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As aptly pointed out by the prosecution, the accused-movant knew that the present cases were filed against her as early as 2006. In fact, the records of these cases show that she filed an “*Urgent Motion to Reduce Bail*” on **October 25, 2006**.³⁴ Interestingly, after she filed the said *motion*, the accused-movant remained at-large and did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of this Court. She only filed the present *motion to dismiss* based on inordinate delay following the promulgation of the Court’s *Decision* on October 25, 2019, with respect to her co-accused, and the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest against her which led to her arrest.

Notably, in the case of *Perez v. People*,³⁵ the Supreme Court, citing the case of *Barker v. Wingo*,³⁶ held that whether and how the defendant or accused asserts his/her right is closely related to the other factors that needed to be considered in the determination of the existence of inordinate delay, thus:


We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. **The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences.** The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. **We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.**³⁷

³⁴ p. 465, *Id*

³⁵ 544 SCRA 532 (2008)

³⁶ 407 US 514 (1972)

³⁷ Emphasis supplied in the original text

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In the same vein, it is jurisprudentially settled that the failure of the accused to take any step to accelerate the disposition of his/her case “conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his [her] objection hence impliedly with his [her] acquiescence.”³⁸ In ***Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan***,³⁹ the Supreme Court held, to wit:

Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, “[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing.” Also, in their petition, they averred: “Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case *did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao* which conducted the preliminary investigation.” They slept on their right - a situation amounting to laches. ***The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right.***⁴⁰ Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.⁴¹ As aptly stated in *Alvizo*, the petitioner therein was “insensitive to the implications and contingencies” of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him “by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his acquiescence.”⁴²





³⁸ *Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan*, 220 SCRA 55 (1993)

³⁹ 875 SCRA 374 (2018)

⁴⁰ Emphasis supplied

⁴¹ Footnote omitted

⁴² pp. 487-488, 360 SCRA 478 (2001)

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Notably, in **Cagang v. Sandiganbayan**,⁴³ the Supreme Court *en banc* clarified that the afore-mentioned rulings in **Alvizo** and **Dela Peña** squarely applies to cases wherein the accused was fully aware that a preliminary investigation against him/her has not yet been fully terminated despite a considerable length of time.⁴⁴

Here, the records unquestionably show that the accused-movant was fully aware that a preliminary investigation against her was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in connection with these cases. Thus, applying the above-mentioned rulings of the High Tribunal to these cases, the accused-movant should have raised the issue of inordinate delay with the Court in 2006, or at the time she filed a *motion to reduce bail*. Her failure to do so at the earliest opportunity and her utter refusal to participate in the proceedings of these cases, despite proper notice, further reinforces her implicit acquiescence to the time spent by the Office of the Ombudsman in the resolution of the *complaint* against her.

It bears emphasizing that although a respondent in a criminal case is not obligated to follow-up on his/her case, jurisprudence teaches that the accused's assertion of his/her right to speedy disposition of cases is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether or not he/she is being deprived thereof.⁴⁵ This is due to the fact that the right to speedy disposition of cases is usually invoked by an accused to any type of proceeding once the delay had become prejudicial to him/her.⁴⁶ Thus, assuming *arguendo* that accused-movant was indeed prejudiced by the purported delay in the preliminary investigation of these cases, she should have raised the issue of inordinate delay at the first instance.⁴⁷

Furthermore, the accused-movant submits that the she was prejudiced by the alleged delay because [1] "*the difficulty in locating documents and witnesses (in support of her defense) is*

⁴³ 875 SCRA 374 (2018)

⁴⁴ *Id*

⁴⁵ **Perez v. People**, 544 SCRA 532 (2008), citing **Barker v. Wingo**, 407 US 514 (1972)

⁴⁶ See **Cagang v. Sandiganbayan**, 875 SCRA 374 (2018)

⁴⁷ *Id*; See also **Perez v. People**, 544 SCRA 532 (2008), citing **Barker v. Wingo**, 407 US 514 (1972)

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enormous;” and, [2] it is doubtful that she and her witnesses would be able to recall the particulars of events which has long taken place.

The Court is unpersuaded.

Jurisprudence instructs that *prejudice* should be assessed in the light of the following interests of the accused: [1] to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; [2] to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and, [3] to limit the possibility that his/her defense will be impaired.⁴⁸ To be clear, aside from her bare allegation that she is now put to a disadvantage due to the passage of time in these cases, the accused-movant failed to demonstrate that she is, or has been, completely prevented from gaining access to the records and/or documents in support of her defenses. Also, her claim that she and her potential witnesses are now unable to recall the details of the subject transactions remains unsubstantiated.

On accused-movant Mababangloob’s reliance on the *resolutions* of the other divisions of this Court in the cases of **People v. Winston Garcia, et al.**,⁴⁹ and **People v. Efren Tungol**,⁵⁰ it must be remembered that this Court operates in Divisions of three (3) Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other.⁵¹ In **Francisco v. Rojas**,⁵² the Supreme Court held that while a ruling of a particular division of the Court of Appeals may be taken cognizance of in some cases, it cannot bind or prejudice a ruling of another division thereof, the former being a co-ordinate authority, thus:

In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts; the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other; and the one highest court does not bind itself, it being


⁴⁸ See **Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan**, 442 SCRA 294 (2004)

⁴⁹ Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0292 [Per J. Diaz-Baldos, Second Division]

⁵⁰ Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0045 [Per J. Ponferrada, Sixth Division]

⁵¹ See **Preagido v. Sandiganbayan**, 476 SCRA 143 (2005); See also **De Guzman v. People**, 119 SCRA 337 (1982)

⁵² 723 SCRA 423 (2014)

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invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.⁵³ The principle of *stare decisis* enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions.

Applying by analogy the above-mentioned pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the present cases, the rulings of the other divisions of this Court likewise have no binding force on the findings of this Division. Further, it must be stressed that the only judicial decisions which form part of our legal system are the decisions of the Supreme Court.⁵⁴ Thus, only the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court can serve as binding precedents to the determinations to be made by the Sandiganbayan.⁵⁵

In sum, the Court does not find that the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman was attended by vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive delay. Thus, the accused-movant cannot validly claim a violation of her constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and due process.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby **DENIES** the *motion to dismiss* filed by accused-movant Elenita C. Mababangloob for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila


AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG
Presiding Justice
Chairperson

⁵³ Footnote omitted

⁵⁴ *Quasha Peña Ancheta & Nolasco Law Office vs. Court of Appeals*, 607 SCRA 712 (2009)

⁵⁵ *Barriga v. Sandiganbayan*, 586 SCRA 63 (2009)




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
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WE CONCUR:



BERNELITO R. FERNANDEZ

Associate Justice



RONALD B. MORENO

Associate Justice

